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Abstract 
This article critiques the legal reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal in Re A 
(Children) – the controversial case which addressed the separation of conjoined 
twins Rose and Grace Attard (or „Mary and Jodie‟). Separation would ensure survival 
for Jodie and death for Mary; as such, the Court of Appeal was required to consider 
whether separation constituted murder or whether it was justifiable as a protective 
measure for Jodie. In this article, the author examines the separate lines of reasoning 
adopted by each of the three judges in Re A, explores the precedents used to justify 
separation, discusses the distinction between „morality‟ and „ethics‟, and the impact 
the decision in Re A has had on subsequent „conjoined twins‟ cases. 
 
Keywords: sanctity of life, Re A conjoined twins, defence of necessity, child‟s best 
interests 
 
Introduction 
In August 2000, twins Rose and Grace Attard (under the pseudonyms Mary and 
Jodie) were born conjoined and severely disadvantaged at Manchester Hospital. 
Whilst Jodie was responsive and relatively healthy,2 Mary had a primitive brain, a 
deficient heart and very little lung tissue.3 Fortunately for Mary, an artery existed 
between the twins which enabled Jodie‟s heart to pump oxygenated blood around the 
bodies of both girls, sustaining Mary‟s life, but tragically this put an intolerable strain 
on Jodie, and the doctors forecast that Jodie‟s heart would be unable to serve them 
both for much more than a further three to six months. 4  They recommended 
separation, to give Jodie a chance for a long and normal life; however they also 
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foresaw that separation would mean immediate and inevitable death for Mary who 
could not survive with her own organs.5 
 
The hospital made an application to the courts for a declaration that separation would 
be lawful, in light of the unusual facts and the twins‟ parents‟ refusal of consent due 
to their beliefs as Roman Catholics. 6  Johnson J granted the declaration that 
separation would be lawful, on the grounds that separation was in the best interests 
of both Jodie and Mary, and that cutting off the blood supply would be analogous to 
removing artificial nutrition and ventilation under the Bland7 principle. The parents of 
the twins then appealed to the Court of Appeal, on the following grounds: (1) That 
separation could not be in Mary‟s best interests; (2) That separation would not be in 
Jodie‟s best interests; (3) Even if the operation was in the best interests of the twins, 
separation would constitute an unlawful act, and could not be likened to a withdrawal 
of treatment but is instead a positive act. This article is a critique of the Court of 
Appeal decision in this case, focusing on three main areas of discussion in the 
judgments - the principle of the sanctity of life, the application of the defence of 
necessity, and the application of private defence. 
 
2 Sanctity of Life 
The court was primarily tasked with assessing whether the separation was in the best 
interests of each of the twins. With regards to Jodie, it did not take the court much 
effort to conclude that her welfare would be best served by being able to grow past 
infancy and lead a normal and healthy life. However, some critics have suggested 
that this conclusion was reached too easily, questioning whether the separation was 
in fact in Jodie‟s best interests. Gillon, for example, acknowledges that, as a result of 
the separation, Jodie would be „severely disabled, would need a series of further 
painful and distressing operations, and when she grew up would always know that 
her life had been saved as a result of a decision taken on her behalf that would kill 
her sister.‟8 The issue of the separation was even less clear with regards to Mary‟s 
best interests. At first instance, Johnson J, taking into account the length and quality 
of life Mary would experience, ruled that Mary‟s life, if allowed to live it, would „be 
very seriously to her disadvantage.‟9 He noted that „however pitiable [Mary‟s] state 
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now, it will never improve during the few months she would have to live if not 
separated‟,10 and held that this was sufficient reason to deny her right to life in favour 
of her sister‟s, stating, „I conclude that the few months of Mary‟s life if not separated 
from her twin would not simply be worth nothing to her, they would be hurtful.‟11 
 
This article suggests that such reasoning is greatly flawed. Harris writes that „where 
the individual with short life expectancy has a life to lead and wants to lead it for 
whatever time is left... it would seem inconceivable that they would be killed against 
their will by a decision of the courts.‟12 Furthermore, in F v West Berkshire Health 
Authoritythe court considered the definition of treatment in the best interests of the 
patient, coming to the conclusion that „the operation or other treatment will be in their 
best interests if, but only if, it is carried out in order either to save their lives, or to 
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health‟ 
[Emphasis added]. 15  None of these potential goals were present in Mary‟s case; as 
such, the ruling of Johnson J that death would be in Mary‟s best interests seems at 
odds with existing authority. Furthermore, in light of this express precedent, it can be 
argued that the court has a duty to conclude that the separation is not in the best 
interests of Mary, and that no other conclusion may be reached without rejecting F 
outright. 
 
In Re Superintendent of Family & Child Service and Dawson, McKenzie J stated: 
 
I do not think that it lies within the prerogative of any parent or of this court 
to look down upon a disadvantaged person and judge the quality of that 
person's life to be so low as not to be deserving of continuance... It is not 
appropriate for an external decision maker to apply his standards of what 
constitutes a liveable life and exercise the right to impose death if that 
standard is not met in his estimation.17 
To make such a decision would be to create as many problems as it would solve; in 
what circumstances would life not be worth living, and who would be the judge of the 
„worth‟ of a person like Mary‟s life? The Court of Appeal rejected the conclusion of 
Johnson J, stating instead that every person‟s life will be worth something to them, 
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however hopeless.18 Ward LJ asked, „is it in Mary‟s best interest that an operation be 
performed to separate her from Jodie when the certain consequence of that 
operation is that she will die?‟ He concluded, simply, that „no, that is not in her best 
interests.‟20  
 
The court therefore found itself in a situation where the interests of the twins were 
opposed, and the question became can, and should, their interests be balanced 
against each other to find a solution? This issue caused the court considerable 
difficulty, since the only differences between the twins related to their length and 
quality of life, a detail which will not usually allow the court to justify the ending of a 
life. Ward LJ quoted a commentary by Keown which noted that making distinctions 
between the twins would require the court to engage in reasoning which „denies the 
ineliminable value of each patient, and engages in discriminatory judgments... about 
whose lives are “worthwhile” and whose are not.‟21 
 
Indeed, as Gillon writes, to balance the interests of the twins is to „balance one child‟s 
inevitable hopeless interest with another child‟s potentially hopeful interests.‟ 22 
However, Harris writes that this „is precisely what you cannot do if you believe that 
each life has an ineliminable value and dignity.‟23 To compare the value to the twins 
of living is to compare the value of their lives, as much as the court insisted otherwise. 
Harris argues that: 
 
Welfare, contra Ward LJ, cannot (unlike justice) be a value of comparable 
importance for otherwise we would all be vulnerable when welfare sums 
indicate that our welfare is less than that of another whose survival our death 
could purchase.24  
 
The court clearly appreciated the dilemma that it faced; however, having held that the 
doctors owed a duty to both Mary and Jodie – to act in their opposed best interests –  
it acknowledged that a balance must be struck. Ward LJ conceded, „I do not see how 
the court can reconcile the impossibility of properly fulfilling each duty by simply 
declining to decide the very matter before it.‟25 
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The court therefore balanced the interests of the two babies, putting the relevant 
issues into „the scales‟;26 however, only practical considerations were included in the 
„weighing up‟, such as their basic right to life, the advantages and disadvantages of 
the separation and „the manner in which they are able to exercise their right to life‟27 
– and not legal or public policy matters. For example, ethical objections or the 
principle of sanctity of life were not included in the exercise, which they plausibly 
could have been. Indeed, Gillon writes that „it would be possible on moral grounds to 
argue that best interests and a consequent operation were morally overridden by the 
evil of killing one to save another.‟28 Furthermore, when the right to life was put in „the 
scales‟, they were given equal weight for each twin; however, Gillon also argues that 
„where the duty [to preserve life] would involve killing another innocent person then 
there are strong arguments for concluding that there cannot be either a moral or a 
legal right to life.‟29 
 
Interestingly, Harris suggests that the material difference between Mary and Jodie is 
their capability for becoming what Harris calls „Persons.‟ Of course, „the law does not 
distinguish between human beings on the basis of their right to life‟,30 although Harris 
suggests that, perhaps subconsciously, the court acknowledged that only one twin 
will ever have the opportunity to live a „biographical life‟31 as a true „Person‟ – a life 
that is capable of including things which make the right to life valuable. He submits 
that this idea of „Personhood‟ separates foetuses in the womb and those in a 
permanent vegetative state from the rest of society, in that they lack „the capacity to 
value existence.‟32 Indeed, Ward LJ implied a similar thought process when he stated 
that an important factor in the decision was „the manner in which [the twins] are 
individually able to exercise their right to life.‟33 
 
Finally, the court turned to what was perhaps the most difficult issue in the case, and 
the one which would ultimately decide the outcome: could the separation be carried 
out lawfully, or would it constitute the murder of Mary? The court drew on authority 
from Re J,34 where counsel had argued that the court was: 
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Never justified in withholding consent to treatment which could enable a 
child to survive a life-threatening condition, whatever the pain or other side 
effects inherent in the treatment and whatever the quality of the life which it 
would experience thereafter.35  
This submission was firmly rejected by the Court of Appeal in that case. It has been 
proposed, both by Keown36 and by Ward LJ37 that counsel in Re J were mistaking the 
sanctity of life doctrine with the doctrine of vitalism, a very similar principle with a 
starkly different practical application, and Ward LJ made very clear that it was the 
former which would apply to the twins. Vitalism, Keown writes, holds that human life 
is sacred, and „is to be preserved at all costs.‟38 However, he continues that it „is as 
ethically untenable as its attempt to maintain life indefinitely is physically 
impossible.‟39 Indeed, the court in Re A found this „too extreme a position to hold.‟40 
 
Sanctity of life, on the other hand, states that „one ought never intentionally to kill an 
innocent human being,‟41 and so provides not a duty on society to prolong life, but a 
prohibition on the intentional shortening of it. That being said, the doctrine still 
espouses certain high standards of conduct and values of its own, and it is by no 
means simple to see how the separation in Re A could be justified, even provided 
that „sanctity of life‟ is more flexible that the doctrine of vitalism. It is an accepted 
principle in law, indeed a foundation of the right to life, that courts will „never sanction 
steps to terminate life‟,42 and it does not take a great leap of faith to construe the 
operation in Re A as a step intended to terminate the life of Mary prematurely. Indeed, 
at first instance Johnson J noted that „if the operation is properly to be regarded as a 
positive act‟, which the Court of Appeal later agreed it would be,43 „then it cannot be 
lawful and cannot be made lawful‟.44 In the Court of Appeal, Ward LJ agreed that „to 
operate to separate the twins may be to murder Mary.‟45  
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However, in Re A the court did take that step, and held that „Mary may have a right to 
life, but she has little right to be alive,‟46 a statement which is clearly at odds with the 
authority. To come to the conclusion that Jodie‟s life is worth Mary‟s premature death 
is to come to the conclusion that Mary‟s life does not hold the „ineliminable value and 
dignity‟47 that everyone else‟s does. But the authority is clear that length and quality 
of life does not justify a person in ending life because they believe their life has no 
value.48 However, it was argued by the Court of Appeal in Re A that no judgments on 
the worth of Mary‟s life had been made,49 and instead the court had looked only at 
whether the treatment was worthwhile, under the authority in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland:   
If the question is asked, as in my opinion it should be, whether it is in [Bland‟s] 
best interests that treatment which has the effect of artificially prolonging his 
life should be continued, that question can sensibly be answered to the effect 
that his best interests no longer require that it should be.50   
 
Indeed, in his analysis of this case, Keown reiterates that: 
In order to decide whether a proposed treatment would be worthwhile, one 
must first ascertain the patient's present condition and consider whether 
and to what extent it would be improved by the proposed treatment... At no 
point in the sanctity assessment is one purporting to pass judgment on the 
worthwhileness of the patient's life.51 
 
Harris, however, questions how the issue of „whether or not the treatment is 
worthwhile [can] be addressed independently of the question of whether the life it 
restores is worthwhile?‟52 He suggests that: 
The treatment is worthwhile if it contributes to the continuance of a worthwhile 
life, a life the continuance of which is a benefit to the individual whose life it is, 
not otherwise.53  
 
This analysis has certain holes; notwithstanding the argument that worthwhile 
treatment requires the life it prolongs to be worthwhile, it is not so clear cut the other 
way round. A life, (such as that of the Down‟s Syndrome baby in Re B)54 may be 
regarded as not worth living by the members of society who are lucky enough to live 
healthy lives, but this will be irrelevant to the worth of the treatment; when the 
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treatment will improve the state of the individual from one disadvantaged state to 
another, less disadvantaged state, the treatment will be worthwhile – quite apart from 
the issue that the life still may be seen by some as not worth living. 
 
However, there is one clear distinction between the aforementioned cases and Re A, 
which the Court in Re A seemingly overlooked; in Re B and similar cases, the 
treatment in question was one which it was hoped would improve the patients‟ quality 
or length of life, and in Bland the treatment, namely the ventilation and artificial 
nutrition, maintained Tony Bland‟s state, the termination of which would cause death. 
In contrast, in Re A the treatment itself – the operation to separate the twins – would 
be the active cause of the end of Mary‟s life, and in such a unique situation it is 
submitted the „worthwhileness‟ of that treatment cannot be a discrete question 
separate from the „worthwhileness‟ of Mary‟s life. The treatments in the former cases 
had benefits of their own, benefits of improving a life which may already be difficult, 
but were benefits all the same; it is on the strength of these benefits that 
„worthwhileness‟ was measured in these cases. However, in Re A the only benefits 
that the Court mentioned for Mary were that her cruel and disadvantaged life would 
no longer have to be lived; this can only be seen as a benefit after, and in the light of, 
an assessment of the „worthwhileness‟ of Mary‟s life. 
 
3 Necessity 
Before Re A, it was an established legal principle that a so called defence of 
„necessity‟ could not justify the killing of another person. In R v Dudley and 
Stephens,55 two shipwrecked sailors killed and ate one of their number – a young 
sailor named Parker – in order to stay alive until they could be rescued; they were 
found guilty of murder, despite their protestations that they acted out of the necessity 
of the situation. However, in Re A, Brooke LJ identified two important features of 
Dudley which distinguished it from Re A, therefore allowing necessity to be used:   
The first objection was evident in the court [in Dudley]'s questions: who is to 
be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative 
value of lives to be measured?56   
 
Such a decision is arbitrary, and the court therefore felt that whilst it may have been 
necessary to kill one of the sailors, it was not necessary to kill Parker instead of any 
of the others. Brooke LJ continued, „[t]he second objection was that to permit such a 
                                                          
55
 R v Dudley and Stephens (1884-1885) LR 14 QBD 273. 
56
 Re A (Children) p.239. 
Plymouth Law Review (2012) 1  
 
140 
 
defence would mark an absolute divorce of law from morality.‟57 It would have meant 
declaring lawful the killing of the innocent for personal gain, a notion which would 
offend the sanctity of life principle. However, he added that „in my judgment, neither 
of these objections are dispositive of the present case.‟58 The Court of Appeal were 
not bound by Dudley, which was heard in the High Court, but chose not to 
disapprove of the decision, instead distinguishing it. However, it is submitted that 
despite the attempts of Brooke LJ, Re A still conflicts with established law on this 
issue of necessity. 
 
First, in Dudley, Coleridge CJ asked „by what measure is the comparative value of 
lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what?‟59 This „question of 
human choice‟,60 if allowed to have been made, would permit „him who is to profit by 
it to determine the necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another‟s life 
to save his own.‟61 The arbitrary nature of the decision of who to sacrifice is what 
most offended the court in Dudley; indeed, they asked „was it more necessary to kill 
[Parker] that one of the grown men? The answer must be „no‟.‟62 In contrast, in Re A 
there was no question of sacrificing Jodie to save Mary, as Mary‟s death, with or 
without the separation, was inevitable. The court quoted the teachings of rabbinical 
scholars in a similar 1977 case in Philadelphia,63 stating that Mary was „designated 
for death.‟64   
 
However, in Dudley the decision of who to kill was based on the honest belief that 
Parker – who had been drinking sea water and was, as a result, deathly ill – was 
going to die imminently, and would provide better sustenance if he was killed before 
he wasted away. Dudley is therefore express authority on the issue that, not only is 
necessity not applicable to a murder charge when the decision of who to sacrifice is 
taken at random, but also that decisions based on likelihood of survival are just as 
arbitrary as any other standard of measurement. It is therefore not acceptable for 
Brooke LJ to state that Re A does not involve the same capricious valuations that 
Dudley did. 
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Furthermore, Harris writes that to allow the sacrifice of one twin because she is 
„designated for death‟ is to „say that value of life is correlated with life expectancy‟,65 a 
conclusion which the court went to great lengths to reject. Ward LJ noted that „it is 
impermissible to deny that every life has an equal inherent value‟;66 yet the court‟s 
method of selecting a twin for sacrifice because she was already unable to live as 
long as the other clearly retained an element of arbitrariness. Ward LJ quoted Keown, 
who wrote that such questions engage: 
In discriminatory judgements, posited on fundamentally arbitrary 
criteria...about whose lives are „worthwhile‟ and whose are not.  The 
arbitrariness is highlighted when it is asked which disabilities, and to which 
degree, are supposed to make life not worth living?67 
   
Likewise, how long must a person have left to live before what would otherwise be 
murder can become lawfully „necessary‟?  As mentioned above, the second objection 
to the defence of necessity in Dudley was that to allow the defence would be to effect 
„a divorce of law from morality.‟68 However, in distinguishing Dudley, Re A Brooke LJ 
argued that: 
There are... those who believe with... sincerity that it would be immoral not 
to assist Jodie if there is a good prospect that she might live a happy and 
fulfilled life if this operation is performed... It is not at all obvious that this is 
the sort of clear-cut case, marking an absolute divorce from law and 
morality, which was of such concern to Lord Coleridge CJ.69 
   
It appears, therefore, that under Re A an act will be covered by the defence of 
necessity so long as it is not completely and thoroughly immoral, rather than 
requiring it to be positively moral. Questionable morality and controversial cases, 
therefore, would be covered under Brooke LJ‟s necessity as they are not „clear-cut‟or 
„absolute‟.71 
 
Further, it is submitted that Brooke LJ‟s use of the „moral divorce‟ distinction is simply 
another way of stating that the separation is the „lesser of two evils,‟ an approach 
expressly denied by the court in Dudley and every court since when necessity is in 
issue. It is submitted that the question to be asked is not „would allowing the defence 
be immoral‟ but instead which outcome is less „evil‟ and does this lesser „evil‟ 
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outcome have a grey area of morality which would circumvent the Dudley objection, 
which requires total, unmitigated immorality? The problem with this approach is that 
any assessment of such situations is subjective, and the defence identifies no criteria 
for assessing which „evil‟ is „the lesser‟. Some may feel that intentionally ending the 
life of a small baby before its natural end constitutes an absolute evil, regardless of 
the other benefits; equally, some may feel that sacrificing the life of an ill and dying 
young man with no dependants to ensure the survival of three men with families was 
morally permissible when measured against the alternative. 
 
Additionally, in Dudley itself Coleridge CJ stated that „law and morality are not the 
same, and many things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal‟;72 thus 
there is a stark difference between „morals‟ and „ethics‟, with only the latter accepted 
as a material consideration in medical law cases (whilst only the former is discussed 
by Brooke LJ in relation to this „morality distinction.‟) Mason and Laurie define ethics 
as „a system of principles or values which assist in decision making... and allows us 
to justify a particular course of action by reference to wider, socially acceptable 
principles or values.‟73 In contrast, morality is a subjective and open assessment of 
what is right and wrong, which changes according to each person, or indeed, each 
judge. Whilst morality is mentioned time and time again during the opinion of Brooke 
LJ, ethics is barely even alluded to, despite the obvious ethical undertones in the 
case.74 It is submitted that an ethical approach would have been capable of ensuring 
greater consistency in the law, whereas the moral approach would have left 
Coleridge CJ in Dudley open to find that killing for survival is immoral, whilst allowing 
Brooke LJ in Re A free to find that separation is the lesser of two evils, according to 
their own moral compasses. 
 
Many academics have attempted to navigate the ethics of necessity in Re A, in the 
absence of express usage by the court. Gardner acknowledges the difficulty with the 
„lesser of two evils‟ approach, instead choosing to explore necessity through other 
avenues. 75  He writes that when necessity is viewed from a consequentialist or 
utilitarian perspective, the court must aim to value the worth of an action in terms of 
its utility to society, and this is perhaps the most applicable of all available ethical 
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frameworks, as Brooke LJ acknowledged that „the doctrine of necessity [is] an 
expression of the philosophy of utilitarianism.‟76 This theory is similar to the moral 
„lesser of two evils‟ approach, as it requires one to consider „which involved the 
greater harm, killing Mary in order to save Jodie, or allowing both to die?‟ However, 
the two approaches are by no means identical, as a utilitarian perspective disregards 
moral and legal considerations, instead assessing worth against usefulness to 
society (or, in this more concentrated and unique case, the individuals involved). As 
such, to justify the separation, a utilitarian view would require that it be „right that it 
should be done; or at least not wrong that it should be done‟.78 
 
However, it is arguable that this is no more helpful that Brooke LJ‟s morality 
approach, since it is a question which Gardner describes as „simply unanswerable.‟79 
The consequences of separation may be no more or less desirable than the 
consequence of failure to separate, depending on personal opinion, and this ethical 
view does not assist in defining which outcome is consequentially preferable when it 
is not obvious, as was the case in Re A. The available case law, however, suggests 
that necessity views excessive loss of life as preferable to an offence to the sanctity 
of life principle, with authority such as Dudley and Stephens and R v Howe80 failing to 
provide the defence. If a consequentialist or utilitarian perspective is applicable, 
therefore, it is difficult to see how Re A is ethically sound. 
 
Robert Walker LJ also sought to justify separation by necessity, although he 
approached the issue slightly differently, choosing to utilise the doctrine of double 
effect. Double effect is a very specialised and uncommon legal principle which, 
because of its delicate and unusual nature, has not received much attention from the 
courts. Robert Walker LJ, however, explained that it may „be seen as a sort of bridge 
between the issue of intention and the issue of necessity.‟81 
 
The doctrine governs cases involving situations „in which an individual acts for a 
good purpose which cannot be achieved without also having bad consequences‟.82 
Robert Walker LJ stated that there are two classes of double effect cases: those 
involving doctors relieving the pain of patients while abbreviating their lives, and 
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those involving emergencies during hazardous activities.84 The former is the more 
widely recognised of the two classes, and was acknowledged in the opinion of Goff 
LJ in Bland:   
It is... the established rule that a doctor may, when caring for a patient who 
is, for example, dying of cancer, lawfully administer painkilling drugs 
despite the fact that he knows that an incidental effect of that application 
will be to abbreviate the patient's life. Such a decision may properly be 
made as part of the care of the living patient, in his best interests.85 
 
Robert Walker LJ took this one step further and stated that the treatment was lawful 
not only because it was in the best interests of the patient, but because „[t]he doctrine 
of double effect prevents the doctor‟s foresight of accelerated death from counting as 
a guilty intention‟;86 in effect, by acting in order to prevent the patient‟s suffering the 
doctor will not have the required intention for murder. 
 
However, on the few occasions that this class of double effect has come to court, one 
thing has been clear – the good effect and the bad consequence must be directed at 
the same person, which, in Re A, was not the case. Whilst the intention was to save 
the life of Jodie, the foreseen consequence of this was to end Mary‟s life prematurely, 
and therefore fell outside the scope of the doctrine. If such a „net good‟ versus „net 
bad‟ approach was held to be encompassed within the principle, other unlawful 
practices, such as killing to harvest healthy organs for example, would become 
defensible. Indeed, Robert Walker LJ acknowledged this and stated that „this type of 
double effect cannot be relevant to conduct directed towards Mary‟, recognising 
instead that the separation would need to be capable of being „something which 
ought to be achieved in the best interests of Mary as well as Jodie.‟ 
 
Robert Walker LJ then went on to explain his second class of double effect, which 
applies when a person is faced with a life or death dilemma, usually during some 
hazardous or remote activity. He gave a number of real life examples, including a 
mountaineer who cut a rope between himself and his dangling climbing partner after 
they both fell in the Andes,89 and the captain of an Australian warship who closed off 
access to a burning engine room, killing all who were inside but saving the ship and 
the rest of its crew.  
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If a person, faced with such a dilemma, acts with the intention of saving his 
own life, or the lives of others, it may be said that leaves no room for a 
guilty intention to harm or even kill the third person.91 
   
The doctors‟ foresight of Mary‟s inevitable death, therefore, would not have 
constituted intention under the Woollin92 principle, as they intended simply to save 
Jodie. 
 
There are certain benefits of this approach to necessity which outweigh the one 
utilised by Brooke LJ. First, the doctrine of double effect does not require reference to 
or distinction from Dudley and Stephens, and so allows an established authority to 
continue to operate without qualifications which may become confusing or exploitable. 
Second, it classes the separation as conduct which was never murder in any form, 
rather than first considering it an unlawful act which needs to be excused, as Brooke 
LJ‟s defence of necessity does. 
 
However, none of the examples that Robert Walker LJ cited for his second class of 
double effect have ever come to court; it is therefore questionable whether he could 
be certain that this second class was applicable or indeed even legally existed. At the 
time of writing, no „emergency necessity‟ cases have ever been justified by lack of 
intention, and pre-Re A the academic literature exclusively described the traditional, 
doctor-patient class of double effect when defining the principle. It is accepted that in 
such cases as described by Robert Walker LJ the perpetrator would not, and should 
not, be culpable. However, justice is served in these situations by the Crown 
Prosecution Service, or other relevant authority, exercising its discretion when 
considering prosecution, rather than the law bending to allow exceptions, as indeed it 
refused to do in Dudley. Moreover, even if the examples provided by Robert Walker 
LJ had come to court and established such a defence, , how could he be so sure that 
it was double effect that would provide it? Perhaps the captain of the Australian ship 
would have been able to rely on the principle of necessity that Brooke LJ espoused, 
or the mountaineer could cite Ward LJ‟s private defence (see below). Robert Walker 
LJ, it seems, created his second class of double effect from nothing, citing a number 
of non-judicial examples – that may or may not have been applicable – as if they 
were conclusive enough to prove its existence. 
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4 Private Defence 
Ward LJ, however, was of the opinion that the most appropriate defence was not 
necessity but private defence, and took the view that „Mary is killing Jodie.‟ 93 
However, Herring94 writes that there are five basic requirements for a circumstance 
when private defence may lawfully be used, not all of which were present in Re A. 
First, the victim must pose a threat; second, that threat must be unjustified; third, the 
use of force must be necessary; fourth, the degree of force must be reasonable; and 
fifth, the defendant must be acting in defence of himself or another.95   
 
In relation to the first element, Uniacke suggests that „the concept of threat is itself 
normative‟,96 in that a person can only be a threat to another when measured against 
some standard which defines what is threatening and what is not. This is an 
interesting theory, and though it has never been expressly defined by the judiciary, it 
is clear from existing authority that there is no rigid benchmark by which to classify „a 
threat.‟ For example, a sufferer of  Asperger Syndrome may find a person standing 
close to them to be threatening, but others in society may not. However, a defendant, 
with or without Asperger Syndrome, who had used private defence in the face of a 
perceived threat would be tried subjectively, on the facts as they honestly believed 
them to be. The question would thus remain „what constitutes a threat to that 
individual‟, and not „what would constitute a threat in the opinion of society at large.‟ 
Uniacke writes that „someone or something that is a threat to B will or might, if 
unchecked, make B worse off in some way‟, and therefore submits that the standard 
that „threat‟ is measured against is the so-called „threatened person‟s‟ prior state – 
their life without the threat. In Re A, however, „there was no interference by or 
involving Mary that undermined Jodie‟s prior position; the twins came into existence 
conjoined and thereby endangered.‟98 Mary was not removing Jodie from a state that 
she usually enjoyed, but rather Mary and Jodie were simply existing in a state that 
they had always existed in. This was not discussed by any of the judges in Re A, let 
alone taken into consideration when applying private defence to the case. 
 
Further, Uniacke draws a distinction in law, between conduct which causes another 
person to be put at a disadvantage somehow, and conduct which causes another 
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person to be more disadvantaged than they ought to be. For example, she writes that 
if one person, B, has collapsed, and another, A, decides to do nothing to resuscitate 
her, B is in a worse off state than she could (or perhaps should) be as a result of A‟s 
failure to act; however, A is still not required to act and B (or others on behalf of B) 
would not be justified in using private defence to force A to act. Uniacke writes that 
this is because „B is not made worse off than she is at present by A‟s negative action. 
Rather, when A decides to do nothing to help B in circumstances where aid is morally 
or legally required, B is worse off than she ought to be.‟99 Similarly, in Re A, Jodie 
was worse off than perhaps she may have been had the twins separated properly in 
the womb, but that should not make defensive action justified in her defence. Instead, 
the measure applied should take into consideration the fact that Jodie and Mary were 
born, and had always existed, as a conjoined and dependent pair, and Mary‟s 
attachment to Jodie did not put Jodie in any worse position than she had ever 
enjoyed before, or would normally enjoy, as in most cases of private defence. 
 
Second, Ward LJ acknowledged that Mary, though harming Jodie, was not an 
aggressor in the situation between the twins, and was not doing anything unlawful.100 
However, he noted that her conduct „does not have to be unlawful‟101 for private 
defence to apply to actions opposed to it, and gave an example of a six-year-old 
shooting others in a school playground, who would not be culpable, due to his age, 
but would still warrant legitimate defensive action.  
He stated that he could:  
See no difference in essence between that resort to legitimate self-defence 
and the doctors coming to Jodie's defence and removing the threat of fatal 
harm to her presented by Mary's draining her lifeblood.103   
 
It is respectfully submitted, however, that there is a material difference between this 
example and the twins‟ case, which was not discussed and which would render 
private defence inappropriate to be used in this context. 
 
In the example given by the court, the child may not be a criminal in law, but it was 
accepted by Ward LJ that he „is not morally innocent‟,104 as he is doing something 
which, if done by someone who was legally culpable, would be unlawful. It is 
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submitted that an attacker must be either doing something which is unlawful or doing 
something which would be unlawful if perpetrated by a person who is capable of 
committing the act unlawfully. 105  Uniacke agrees and writes that „the distinction 
between a culpable and non-culpable unjust threat does not tell us the conditions 
under which A constitutes a threat to B.‟106 Note however, in Re A, it was common 
ground amongst the judges that Mary, though a threat, was not engaging in criminal 
or unlawful activity. Mary was not committing any crime, and not just because she 
was too young to be blamed for her actions – as in Ward LJ‟s example – but because 
the act in itself, being born conjoined, was not an act which was blameworthy, unlike 
Ward LJ‟s example. It therefore seems inappropriate to apply private defence. 
 
Third, the force must be necessary and with regards to the specific requirements for 
the law on private defence, the threat must be pressing and imminent.107 The twins, 
however, had three to six months with the most pessimistic diagnosis,108 and perhaps 
much more, until the threat of death would realise itself. Additionally, it was noted by 
the surgeons that it may have been possible to perform an emergency procedure on 
the twins in the event that Mary died before Jodie, or Jodie‟s heart began to fail – an 
option which did not involve the acceleration of Mary‟s death. It therefore seemed 
„unnecessary‟ to sacrifice the remainder of Mary‟s life, and the fact that Jodie would 
have had a better chance of survival of an elective procedure was irrelevant; private 
defence does not allow a victim to choose their preferred method of defence, but 
rather requires that they use the least aggressive option available. 
 
The fourth requirement states that the degree of force used must be reasonable, and 
Re A is an unusual situation with regards to the degrees to which the doctors had to 
go to to remove the threat posed by Mary. In most cases of legitimate self-defence, 
the defendant will have acted merely to remove the threat and, in instances of fatal 
force, death will have been merely an unfortunate consequence of that attempt. In Re 
A, however, the threat was caused by the very fact that Mary lived, and the defensive 
action was aimed at removing her life support, rather than stopping her conduct. The 
concept may be best explained by way of an example: if one person, A, felt 
threatened by another, B, A or others on his behalf would be justified in removing the 
threat posed by B, but would not be justified in killing B so that he was no longer able 
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to pose a threat. Likewise, a court could not order that B be killed to protect A. This is 
not an issue that is discussed in the academic literature on Re A, nor is there any 
case law available. However, it is clear that the only way that Jodie could be 
protected from the threat posed by Mary was by killing her so that she was no longer 
able to put a strain on Jodie‟s heart. 
 
Fifth, the act must be in defence of the „victim‟, and of all five requirements, this is the 
only one which does pose an obstacle. Coincidentally (or perhaps not), this is also 
the only element of the doctrine which the Court of Appeal in Re A drew upon when 
applying private defence to the case. Robert Walker LJ stated that the court and the 
doctors had „a duty to protect and save Jodie‟s life,‟109 and Ward LJ agreed, stating 
that:  
The reality here – harsh as it is to state it, an unnatural as it is that it should 
be  happening – is that Mary is killing Jodie... as surely as a slow drip of 
poison.  How can it be just that Jodie should be required to tolerate that 
state of affairs?110   
 
Likewise, Gillon writes that Mary was „a dangerous threat to the life of [Jodie]‟111 and 
thus private defence was the most appropriate defence to apply.112 
 
Conclusion 
This article submits that the decision in Re A was not legally justifiable, in light of the 
conflicting legal principles, as they „fail to utterly justify, either legally or morally, the 
overruling of the parents‟ wishes.‟ 113  The objections to the court‟s reasoning 
discussed in this article are two-fold. First, the decision offends the sanctity of life 
principle, declaring the active termination of human life ex ante by civilians lawful for 
the first time in English legal history. Second, none of the defences used by the court 
were sufficient to excuse or justify offence to the principle, as they were either 
misapplied by the court, inappropriate in the circumstances, or, in the case of Robert 
Walker LJ‟s double effect, fictitious. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning 
has been described as „confused and mutually inconsistent‟114 and their failure to 
agree on a single, applicable rule of law which would allow the separation to lawfully 
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take place damages the credibility of the decision. Each judgement becomes 
counter-productive when viewed in the context of one single decision by the court; 
whilst each judge outlined the reasoning of their own defence, they simultaneously 
imply that the other defences are not applicable.  
 
Unfortunately, this has lead to a „mix-and-match‟ law, where judges and academics 
are able to choose which judgement would be most applicable, and use that to their 
advantage. In May 2001, twins Alyssa and Bethany Nolan were born in Australia, 
conjoined at the head.115 At a few days old Bethany‟s blood pressure began to rise, 
and doctors were unable to treat her without bringing Alyssa‟s blood pressure down 
too, which would have been fatal for a healthy baby. Clearly, Ward LJ‟s private 
defence would have been inappropriate in the circumstances, as neither was directly 
causing the other‟s death. Instead, there was merely a bar to treatment provided by 
one‟s attachment to the other. Likewise, which to treat and which to sacrifice would 
be a wholly human choice, as both were viable but not at the same time, making 
Brooke LJ‟s necessity inapplicable. Robert Walker LJ‟s double effect would, however, 
have allowed the operation to be carried out lawfully in that situation. 
 
In the event, Bethany‟s situation worsened and she went into cardiac arrest, with 
doctors predicting that she had only 24 hours to live; her death also meant death for 
Alyssa, whilst separation would result in instant death for Bethany.116 In this situation, 
Brooke LJ‟s necessity was, in theory, applicable, as Bethany had been „designated 
for death‟, and no one was required to choose who to sacrifice and who to save 
between the twins – as in Re A. However, when the case came to court, 117 
Chesterman J applied the reasoning of Robert Walker LJ, and held that Bethany‟s 
death would not be the intention of the doctors, stating that „the operation is one to 
save the life of Alyssa. The circumstances, including the loss of Bethany, would, in 
my opinion, make the operation reasonable.‟118 
 
Likewise, a year later, twins Natasha and Courtney Smith were born conjoined at the 
chest in London, sharing a heart which was not strong enough to support them 
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both.119 They passed away before their case was heard before a court, but it had 
been planned by hospital and their parents during the pregnancy that Natasha would 
be given the heart and Courtney would be surgically separated from her sister, an 
operation which would mean Courtney‟s immediate death. In this situation, not only 
would Brooke LJ‟s necessity not apply, it would serve as an express authority, in 
favour of Courtney, that the operation could not take place, as that arbitrary element 
of human choice that so offended Brooke LJ in Re A and Coleridge CJ in Dudley 
would be present. However, under Robert Walker LJ‟s double effect necessity the 
separation would be entirely lawful, as the doctors could be said to be intending only 
the good effect of saving one of the two twins rather than letting both die. 
 
In light of such confusion and misapplication, it is submitted that the court may well 
have first answered the case according to their own personal views and then 
searched for relevant law to support their decision. Such confusion and inconsistency 
generates weak authority for future cases, such as those mentioned above, and 
leads to a lack of established, relevant law which can be called upon in conjoined 
twin cases, quite apart from „[blurring] the application of particular norms that are 
important to each of the defences in question.‟120 Robert Walker LJ asserted that the 
decision in Re A „should not be regarded as a further step down a slippery slope 
because the case of conjoined twins provides a unique problem‟;121 worryingly, it 
seems that conclusion was incorrect on at least one count. It is therefore hoped by 
many that Re A does not follow Bland down that slippery slope, or constitute another 
„morally and intellectually dubious distinction... [in] a context where the ethical 
foundations of the law are already open to question.‟123 
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